Despite all the Pentagon happy talk about network-centric warfare and interoperability, the U.S. Army is fighting the war on terror from stovepipes.

At a typical combat brigade tactical operations center, the common operation picture may be supplied by a single, isolated application. In such a scenario, none of the other systems in the tactical operations center are interoperable with the common operation picture system. For the information to be shared, an operator of the tactical air support, for example, may need to write down the information on a piece of paper, walk over to the common operation picture system and enter the data manually.

This situation would be understandable if there were no solutions for such problems. There are, but any new approaches, when suggested, are habitually met with either indifference or passive resistance. U.S. Army staff personnel greatly prefer their stovepipes, and rarely are they willing to step outside their comfort zones, even if their performance could be improved. Ignorance is bliss.

At higher echelons, U.S. Army staff sections are often bloated and inefficient. There is always a great deal of activity, but there is also an inherent inability to distinguish between motion and progress. When inefficiencies are recognized, there is a tendency to increase the size of the staff as a solution. The additional personnel then generate new stovepiped teams. Operating in isolation and not sharing information, they invariably create two inefficient teams rather than just one.

The processes and products of staff work are frequently unclear, ad hoc and lack transparency. This is actually the preferred staff situation, because it hides both inefficiencies and incompetence and acts as a bulwark against changing the stovepipe. If no one really understands what you do or what results you produce -- if any -- it immunizes you from measurement, criticism or reorganization.

This vertically integrated paradigm allows only the slow movement of information up and down the individual stovepipes, but rarely between them. It tends to inhibit quick reaction to actionable intelligence or the ability to adapt easily to new conditions on the battlefield.

A project called the "Rapid Adaptation Initiative," co-sponsored by the 25th Infantry Division, currently serving in Iraq, and the Center for Army Lessons Learned at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., is attempting to address these issues and change the way information is shared during ongoing combat and civil-military operations.

The aim of the Rapid Adaptation Initiative is to leverage the power of information and reduce vertical stovepipes that slow or reduce the ability to share best practices rapidly. It is designed to provide timely knowledge to the soldier to save lives and defeat the enemy by getting inside the enemy's decision cycle.

Unlike many network-centric warfare scenarios, this initiative focuses its effort at the company and platoon level, sharing information horizontally at the lowest echelons rather than the time-consuming process of running it up and down non-integrated staff stovepipes.

Coupling this concept with supporting knowledge-management processes and an appropriate network technology, critical information can be captured quickly as "best practices" and disseminated across unit boundaries -- in particular, bridging those gaps in unit areas of responsibility where the enemy tends to congregate. Additional data mining across various knowledge networks and centers, both in theater and in the United States, can provide an additional means to address quickly non-standard challenges in innovative and creative ways and stay one step ahead of a rapidly adapting enemy.

The merits of the Rapid Adaptation Initiative notwithstanding, the power of the U.S. Army's stovepipe mentality is formidable. Resistance by the traditional staff's "stay in your lane" approach could terminate even a laudable project in its infancy.

It remains to be seen whether the U.S. Army values its soldiers more than its stovepipes.

(Lawrence C. Sellin, Ph.D., is an U.S. Army reservist, an Afghanistan veteran and is currently serving in Iraq.)

(United Press International's "Outside View" commentaries are written by outside contributors who specialize in a variety of important issues. The views expressed do not necessarily reflect those of United Press International. In the interests of creating an open forum, original submissions are invited.)

Related Links

Memory Foam Mattress Review

SPACE MEDIA NETWORK PROMOTIONS Solar Energy Solutions Tempur-Pedic Mattress Comparison ... Newsletters :: SpaceDaily :: SpaceWar :: TerraDaily :: Energy Daily XML Feeds :: Space News :: Earth News :: War News :: Solar Energy News